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Introduction
A revolution is a drama involving a change of regime. But unlike normal changes of government, it 
is always accompanied by the end of an old system and the birth of a new one. Needless to say, those 
most in the spotlight in this drama are the directors and actors of the new system. Therefore, revolu-
tions are often viewed in the context of history in a way that conforms to their own perspective and are 
justified accordingly. Discussions of such events focus on questions such as “Why did they succeed?” 
“How has the revolution they initiated shaped the fate of society, state and nation?” etc.
Vietnam’s August Revolution of 1945 is a typical case. The Revolution is viewed by Vietnamese as 
first and foremost the victory of Hồ Chí Minh and the Việt Minh led by him, as well as the birth of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.2 Hà Nội, the capital of Tonkin and of the colony of French Indochi-
na, was always the focal point of the Revolution. Hồ Chí Minh established a provisional government 
and declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hà Nội. There he also 
worked to manifest the authority of the new government, dealing with military representatives of the 
Chinese Guomindang who came in as Allied occupiers and with the French, who were determined to 
re-establish colonial rule. Meanwhile, around the same time, another dramatic event was developing in 
Huế, the royal capital in Annam (central Vietnam), approximately 700 km south of Hà Nội. More ac-
curately, perhaps, we should speak of these particular developments as one scene within the larger dra-
ma of the August Revolution. The “tragic hero” of this scene was Bảo Đại (r. 1925‒45), the last Emperor 
of the Nguyễn Dynasty.
In March 1945, soon after the coup de force against the French by the Japanese military, Bảo Đại de-
clared that the 1884 Treaty of Protectorate with France was null and void and announced the indepen-
dence of the Empire of Vietnam, following a proposal made by Yokoyama Masayuki, a Japanese “Am-
 1 This paper is by and large a translation of the author’s article in Japanese: 白石昌也 [Shiraishi Masaya] 「王権の喪失：ヴェトナム
八月革命と最後の皇帝」 [The fall of a royal throne: The August Revolution in Vietnam and the last Emperor] in土屋健治編 
[Tsuchiya Kenji ed.] 『講座現代アジア』 [Course: Contemporary Asia], vol. 1 （ナショナリズムと国民国家 [Nationalism and na-
tion-state], 東京大学出版会 [University of Tokyo Press], 1994, pp. 309‒40.
 2 白石昌也 [Shiraishi Masaya]『ベトナム：革命と建設のはざま』[Vietnam between revolution and nation-building], 東京大学出
版会 [University of Tokyo Press], 1993, p. 34; a list of major works on the August Revolution is on p. 244.
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bassador.”3 In April, the Emperor ordered Trần Trọng Kim to form the first Cabinet of an 
“independent” nation. This was actually the birth of false “independence” under a new master, namely 
the Japanese military. The Bảo Đại-Trần Trọng Kim regime did not last very long, however. It was not 
easy for the government to create an “independent” nation during the final phase of the war when Ja-
pan’s defeat seemed virtually imminent. The dysfunctional government rapidly fell into a state of pa-
ralysis. Shortly afterward, on August 15, Japan surrendered to the Allies. In the meantime, the waves of 
revolution coming from the north took the imperial capital of Huế by storm. A week later Bảo Đại of-
fered to abdicate and transfer power to the Việt Minh revolutionary government. On August 30, he 
held an official abdication ceremony in the presence of representatives of the provisional government 
sent from Hà Nội. This was only a little more than five months after the March declaration of “inde-
pendence.” The abdication of Bảo Đại signaled the end of the Nguyễn Dynasty that had lasted for 143 
years, and at the same time, the closure of a thousand years of feudal dynasties in Vietnam.
From a historical perspective, the abdication of Bảo Đại and the collapse of the Nguyễn Dynasty 
were in a way inevitable, and those events could have been seen as just a few minor episodes in the 
powerful surge of the August Revolution. The Nguyễn Dynasty, which had been incorporated into the 
French colonial system in the1880s, was generally viewed as nothing more than a “puppet” monarchy. 
In March 1945 Bảo Đại, who had become the last Emperor of that puppet regime, bet the fate of the 
Dynasty on the “wrong horse,” namely the Japanese military. The latter were stunned at their defeat, 
and by that point the central and local institutions of the Bảo Đại-Trần Trọng Kim government had al-
ready fallen into a state of paralysis. Even inside the Cabinet, a number of Ministers were expressing 
their intention to resign. There was an air of excitement for the Revolution even in the royal capital. 
Day after day crowds of demonstrators carrying red flags with a gold star and revolutionary slogans 
and holding swords and sticks were surging past the gates of the royal palace.
Emperor Bảo Đại had no other choice but to abdicate; he was destroyed by the Revolution. This is 
the logical conclusion from a historical perspective.4 But why did he consent to “voluntary” abdication 
and transfer of power? A mere narrative of political events may not fully answer this question. More-
over, the drama surrounding the last Emperor was not complete with Bảo Đại’s decision to step aside. 
The revolutionary government accepted the formal transfer of power by sending a representative 
 3 Yokoyama Masayuki was actually “conseiller économique” (economic advisor) at the Japanese Embassy, cum director of the 
Institute of Japanese Culture in Hanoi. (His personal memoirs in Archives d’outre-mer: FRANOM 2 HCI/226～227, ch.1). 
Perhaps he was treated as an “Ambassador” as a matter of convenience in negotiating with the Court. Matsumoto Shunichi, 
Ambassador to French Indochina (in Hà Nội) returned to Japan on May 7, two months after the Japanese military coup; no 
replacement was nominated by Tokyo. See秦郁彦 [Hata Ikuhiko] 『戦前期日本官僚制の制度・組織・人事』[System, organiza-
tion, and personnel of the Japanese bureaucracy in the prewar period], 東京大学出版会 [University of Tokyo Press], 1981, p. 309.
 4 For the official Việt Minh view of the Bảo Đại-Trần Trọng Kim government, see Trần Huy Liệu et al. ed., Xã hội Việt Nam 
trong thời Pháp-Nhật [Vietnamese society during the Franco‒Japanese period], 2 vols., NXB Sử Địa, Hà Nội, 1957. A partial 
Japanese translation is inアジア・アフリカ研究所編 [Institute of Asia-African Studies ed.] 『資料ベトナム解放史』 [Documents: 
History of Vietnamese liberation], Vol. 1, 労働旬報社 [Rodo Junposha], 1970, pp. 238‒320): for various events in Huế and oth-
er major cities during this period, see Trần Huy Liệu et al. ed., Cách mạng áng Tám [The August Revolution], 2 vols., NXB 
Sử học, Hà Nội, 1960; selections from this book are translated in the Japanese work just cited, pp. 353‒404.
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group from Hà Nội to the abdication ceremony, and it took the further step of recognizing the abdicat-
ed Emperor (now a commoner known by his personal name of Vĩnh Thụy) as “Supreme Adviser” of 
the new regime.
According to official interpretations by the Hà Nội authorities, these measures were a reflection of 
the Việt Minh government’s generosity towards the “feudal ruling class.” They are also portrayed as 
demonstrations of Hồ Chí Minh’s commitment to “national solidarity.”5 However, the official interpre-
tation only provides a somewhat simplistic view of the process whereby an empire or “universe” with 
the Emperor at the top was destroyed and finally assimilated by the revolutionary government. In this 
paper, the author will focus on Bảo Đại around the time of the Revolution to understand how he saw it 
and what led him eventually to decide on his “voluntary” abdication, based on memoirs written by his 
close aides as well as Bảo Đại himself. At the same time, we will also examine the implications of the 
attitude of Hồ Chí Minh and his revolutionary government, which accepted Bảo Đại’s “voluntary” act.
While Bảo Đại represented the spirit of the past as the symbol of a dying “empire,” he tried to adapt 
himself to the new order created by the revolutionary government. That effort alone may have been a 
reflection of his way of life. At the same time, his life must have had some common ground with the 
lives of many Vietnamese, including not only mandarin bureaucrats and village notables, but perhaps 
urban intellectuals and farmers as well, who to some degree had preserved the old order in their world-
view. Thus Bảo Đại’s actions may have had considerable influence on their behavior and thinking.
I.　Prior to the August Revolution̶the Emperor and the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet
Phạm Khắc Hòe, who was the Chief Palace Secretary （Ngự tiền Văn phòng Tổng lý 御前文房総理） 
provides the following account in his memoir.6 Following the Japanese military coup on March 9, 
1945, Emperor Bảo Đại issued the first imperial rescript （dụ諭） of the “independent” nation on March 
17, whose essential features were; (i) the Emperor would assume power himself; (ii) the political sys-
tem would be based on the Confucian motto dân vi quý （“the people are the most precious,” 民為貴）; 
(iii) adequate human resources would be mustered for building the foundations of a nation; and (iv) 
policies matching the people’s aspirations would be implemented. Chief Secretary Hòe had high ex-
pectations for the idea that “the people are the most precious.” He made efforts for the formation of a 
new Cabinet, replacing the existing Privy Council（Viện Cơ mật機密院）. On March 19, the Six Minis-
ters （Lục bộ ượng thư六部尚書） led by Phạm Quỳnh submitted their resignation to the Emperor, 
and thus the Privy Council was dissolved. The Emperor sent invitation telegrams to key personnel liv-
ing in various places in compliance with the recommendation of Hòe and other officials. The Court 
 5 For example, editor Hồng Chương’s preface in Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế đến chiến khu Việt Bắc [From the Huế 
Court to the Việt Bắc combat zone], NXB Hà Nội, Hà Nội, 1983, pp. 6‒7.
 6 Unless otherwise specified, the discussion in this section is based on ibid. See also the 1985 edition (published by NXB Thành 
phố Hồ Chí Minh) and the 1987 edition (published by NXB Thuận Hóa). There are some differences between the first edition 
(pubished in 1983) and the later re-editions. This book has been translated into Japanese: 白石昌也訳 [Shiraishi Masaya tr.] 
『ベトナムのラスト・エンペラー』平凡社 [Heibon-sha], 1995. A short biography of Hòe is found in the editor’s preface.
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initially considered appointing Ngô Ðình Diệm as head of the new Cabinet. However, as soon as they 
recognized that this went against the Japanese authorities’ wishes, they gave the job to Trần Trọng Kim, 
an elder Confucian scholar and historian. On April 17, Kim submitted a cabinet list of eleven members 
to the Emperor.
The new Cabinet did not consist of elderly court bureaucrats like the conventional Six Ministers. 
Though there were a few older men, including Kim himself, the majority of the Cabinet members were 
young professionals such as lawyers, medical doctors, and engineers who had received a French-style 
education. Moreover, very few individuals considered to be pro-Japanese political activists were in-
cluded in the new Cabinet.7 The novelty of Cabinet members with no bureaucratic background was 
first demonstrated in the Court ceremony for receiving their official appointments. They attended the 
official ceremony dressed not in traditional formal attire, but instead in plain jackets, trousers and 
shoes with Vietnamese-style turbans. After the official appointment ceremony, the new Cabinet minis-
ters attended a cocktail party, instead of the traditional audience with the Emperor and Empress. They 
were invited to sit on chairs surrounding a sofa occupied by the imperial couple. Their cheerful and re-
laxed conversation lasted for more than an hour. Their talk was sprinkled with French words and also 
the sounds of champagne corks popping. The Emperor was having friendly conversations with Cabinet 
members who had studied in France on topics such as the sophisticated Parisian lifestyle.
According to Bảo Đại’s memoir, he received the rank of Crown Prince at the age of nine in 1922, and 
shortly after that he went to France for his schooling. He continued to live in France until 1932, his 
stay interrupted only by a short home visit in 1926 for his coronation ceremony after his father, Em-
peror Khải Định (r. 1916‒25), died. Bảo Đại was the first (and the last) Vietnamese ruler to have stud-
ied in France. Unlike other Emperors in the past, he did not practice formal polygamy. The Empress 
Nam Phương was a daughter of a Catholic millionaire in Cochinchina. She was only 18 years old when 
they married in 1934. Educated in France as well, she loved sports and music just like the Emperor. A 
son and three daughters were born to the couple prior to 1945.8
Now, let us continue delving into the recollections of Phạm Khắc Hòe regarding the final months of 
the war. Before long, the Emperor was losing his motivation for heading the “independent” govern-
ment bestowed by the Japanese. In early June, Nguyễn Duy Quang, Provincial Governor of Khánh 
Hòa, was recalled to the Court and appointed Minister of the Imperial Household (a new non-Cabinet 
 7 The Kim Cabinet and its composition are discussed in Masaya Shiraishi, “La présence japonaise en Indochine 1940‒1945” in 
Paul Isoart ed., L’Indochine Française 1940‒1945, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1982, pp. 233‒50; and Shiraishi, “The 
background to the formation of the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet in April 1945: Japanese plans for governing Vietnam,” in Takashi 
Shiraishi and Motoo Furuta ed., Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 
113‒41. The original version of the latter is 白石昌也「チャン・チョン・キム内閣成立（1945年 4月）の背景：日本当局の対ベト
ナム統治構想を中心として』，in土屋健治，白石隆編 [Tsuchiya Kenji and Shiraishi Takashi ed.], 東南アジアの政治と文化』[Poli-
tics and culture of Southeast Asia] 東京大学出版会 [University of Tokyo Press], 1984, pp. 33‒69. See also Kim’s memoir, Một 
cơn gió bụi [A gust of dusty wind], NXB Vĩnh Sơn, Sài Gòn, 1969, pp. 46ff; the book has been translated into Japanese by陳荊
和 (Chen Chingho):「風塵のさなかに：見聞録 (2)」『創大アジア研究』[Soka University Asian Studies] no. 2 (1981), pp. 175‒217.
 8 Bao Dai, Le dragon d’Annam, Plon, Paris, 1980, pp. 11‒68. See also Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, p. 89 for their chil-
dren.
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post). Quang came from an extremely rich family, and his wife was a celebrated beauty. With this 
wealthy retainer in his entourage, the Emperor fell back into the life of gambling, dining, drinking, and 
hunting which he had followed before the Japanese coup de force changed his circumstances. He was 
sometimes accompanied on overnight hunting trips to Quảng Trị by the young and beautiful French 
wife of Ambassador Yokoyama, his personal advisor.9
Phạm Khắc Hòe became even more disappointed with the attitude of the new Prime Minister, Trần 
Trọng Kim, toward the motto “the people are the most precious.” Kim interpreted it in line with a 
phrase from the Analects of Confucius10 that “The people may be made to follow a path of action, but 
they may not be made to understand it” （dân khả sứ do chi, bất khả sứ tri chi 民可使由之，不可使知之）; 
in other words, one can only expect the people to obey a ruler blindly, but not to understand the prin-
ciples of politics. In Hòe’s mind, the original meaning of Mencius’s saying “the people are the most 
precious, then the state, and least of all the monarch” （dân vi quý, xã tắc thứ chi, quân vi khinh民為貴，
社稜次之，君為軽） was that the ruler was less important than the people or the state. 11 Witnessing the 
conservative attitude of elderly Confucian scholar Kim, Hòe was losing hope for the new government.
By June or July, news of the expansion of Việt Minh power in the northern region had reached the 
Court in Huế. Half of the Cabinet, including Trần Trọng Kim, left in July to investigate the situation in 
Tonkin as well as to negotiate with the Headquarters of the Japanese military in Hà Nội. By the time 
Kim returned to Huế in early August, the loyalties of the younger ministers had already drifted away. 
On August 5, the Prime Minister offered the Cabinet’s resignation to the Emperor, who accepted it the 
following day. Nonetheless, the Emperor was compelled to ask Kim to form a new Cabinet since he 
could not find anybody else at that point who was willing to take such a risk. Thus Kim remained as 
interim Prime Minister. Through personal contacts with the young ministers as well as conversations 
with Tôn Quang Phiệt,12 a Việt Minh intellectual living in Huế, Phạm Khắc Hòe became increasingly 
pessimistic about the Empire’s future. Phiệt broke the news to Hòe that the “top executive” had given 
the order to organize the Emperor’s abdication. The “top executive” meant the Việt Minh leadership, 
but Phiệt refrained from giving any details. On August 12, the Emperor issued an imperial rescript 
(dụ) to reappoint Kim’s recently resigned Ministers as an “interim Cabinet.”13
 9 Yokoyama had originally a Japanese wife, but after her death he married a French woman.
10 This is a phrase found in the Analects論語 of Confucius, “Taibo” 泰伯 section; 早稲田大学編輯部編 [Waseda University Edito-
rial Board ed.] 『先哲遺著国字解全書』(Complete book of Japanese interpretations of ancient philosophers’ works), vol. 1, 早
稲田大学出版部 [Waseda University Press], 1909, pp. 149‒50; 吉田賢抗 [Yoshida Kenko],『論語』[Analects of Confucius]（新
釈漢文大系一）[Compendium of Chinese classics in new interpretations I] ,明治書院 [Meiji Shoin], 1960, p. 182.
11 This is a phrase found in Mencius, Jinxin Part Two孟子盡心下；早稲田大学編輯部編 [Waseda University Editorial Board ed.] 
『先哲遺著国字解全書』(Complete book of Japanese interpretations of ancient philosophers’ works), vol. 2, 早稲田大学出版部 
[Waseda University Press], 1910, p. 455; 内野熊一郎 [Uchino Kumaichiro],『孟子』[The Book of Mencius] （新釈漢文大系四） 
[Compendium of Chinese classics in new interpretations Ⅳ ], 明治書院 [Meiji Shoin] , 1960, pp. 491‒92: 市川本太郎 [Ichika-
wa Mototaro],『孟子之綜合的研究』[Comprehensive study of Mencius], 市川先生記念会（長野）[Mr. Ishikawa Memorial 
Association], Nagano City, 1974, pp. 370ff.
12 Tôn Quang Phiệt was from the Nghệ-Tĩnh region like Phạm Khắc Hòe. Phiệt would later become a major player in the Histor-
ical Study group in Hà Nội along with Trần Huy Liệu, Minister of Propaganda in the first Việt Minh government.
13 Sources differ as to when the Kim administration actually resigned. Neither Bảo Đại’s nor Kim’s memoirs mention any recon-
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Around August 15, with the Japanese surrender, a movement emerged in the Court led by Nguyễn 
Duy Quang (Minister of the Imperial Household), Phạm Quỳnh (former Minister of the Interior), and 
Trần Văn Chương (Kim’s Foreign Minister). They tried to communicate with their former French 
masters in order to bring the situation under control.14 Phạm Khắc Hòe took precautions to keep the 
Emperor from becoming involved in this movement. On the morning of the 17th, the Emperor presid-
ed over a meeting of the interim Cabinet. Foreign Minister Chương proposed to send messages to 
Harry S. Truman, King George VI, Chiang Kai-shek, and Charles De Gaulle. Overcoming an objection 
that he should also send a letter to Stalin, the Emperor adopted the first proposal.15
Then a motion was made by some of the young Ministers, including Interior Minister Trần Đình 
Nam claiming that not only the Cabinet but also the Emperor himself should “resign” and transfer 
their power to the Việt Minh. The suggestion was based on the grounds that the Việt Minh was the 
most powerful influence, and thus the best way to prevent foreign manipulation was to have all the 
people tightly unite around that force. Kim raised strenuous objections to the suggestion that the Em-
peror should “resign,” and the two sides got into a heated debate. A few of the Ministers with legal 
training mediated and proposed a compromise plan to maintain the monarchy as a formality while 
transferring real power to the Việt Minh, who would be asked to form a Cabinet. This suggestion was 
based on the rationale that a “legitimate” government capable of maintaining order and taking a posi-
tion against the imminent Allied occupation was an urgent need.
Imperial Rescript No. 105 dated August 17 was immediately prepared; it was Hòe’s job as usual to 
prepare the official document and obtain the Emperor’s signature. The draft consisted of two main 
points. First, it said that Bảo Đại would be willing to transfer power to the Việt Minh and invite its 
leaders to Huế to arrange the formation of a new Cabinet. Second, it said the issue of the form of gov-
ernment would be decided by the people later, and that the Emperor should comply with the people’s 
will as to whether he should stay or leave. Bảo Đại was in a good mood, for he had bought some time 
and was able to maintain his royal throne for the time being. It was decided that Phan Anh, Minister of 
Youth, would be sent to Hà Nội to convey the Emperor’s intention.
Just as Bảo Đại was about to close the cabinet meeting, Interior Minister Trần Đình Nam proposed 
that an imperial decree （chiếu詔） should be issued to call for national unity. Phạm Khắc Hòe, who had 
been consulted on the matter ahead of time, read out the draft. It said that the people of Vietnam were 
entitled and resolved to maintain independence and asked all patriotic Vietnamese to support the Em-
peror and help the nation. The decree also promised that Bảo Đại was committed to becoming a role 
model for the people in a spirit of self-sacrifice. Some Cabinet members including Kim made an issue of 
the wording of the latter point. However, Bảo Đại agreed on the original draft. It said as follows:
stitution of the Cabinet after its initial resignation. The discussion here follows Hòe’s account.
14 Trần Huy Liệu et al. eds, Cách mạng áng Tám also mentions a movement in the Court trying to collaborate with the French; 
seeアジア・アフリカ研究所編，『資料ベトナム解放史』，p. 393.
15 Bảo Đại, Dragon d’Annam, pp. 114‒5 states that he sent messages to world leaders on August 18.
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In order to strengthen national independence and protect the rights of the people, We the Emper-
or are willing to make every sacrifice. We took the Throne for the well-being of the people of Viet-
nam. We would choose to be an ordinary citizen of an independent nation rather than the ruler of 
an enslaved nation. We trust that the entire people will be committed to uniting their hearts and 
making sacrifices just as We are doing.
In the afternoon on the same day, Hoè prepared the official document to be submitted to the Emperor 
for his signature.16
II.　e Sage of Nam Đàn: A 16th-Century Prophet and the Destiny of the Empire
1.　e First Prophecy
Although an imperial rescript was issued to order the Việt Minh to form a cabinet, there was no re-
ply from Hà Nội. The Emperor was frustrated at not being able to identify the Việt Minh leaders. From 
Bảo Đại’s perspective, the only reasonable sequence of events was for whoever received an order to 
come instantly to Huế to see him before proceeding any further. On August 20, Phạm Khắc Hòe heard 
a rumor that a declaration by revolutionary Nguyễn Ái Quốc calling for an uprising had been posted 
in Huế, which was filled with demonstrators. Hòe immediately went to confirm this before reporting it 
to the Emperor. Bảo Đại knew nothing about Nguyễn Ái Quốc other than that he was the author of a 
play titled “Bamboo Dragon” which mocked Emperor Khải Định. Although Hòe’s knowledge about 
Quốc was also limited, he told the Emperor everything he knew. However, stories about “a famous rev-
olutionary who had traveled to Western countries in his earlier life and got involved in political activi-
ties” did not attract Bảo Đại’s attention.17 For a young ruler who had studied in France for over ten 
years and had a better command of French than Vietnamese, Quốc’s “Western-influenced” background 
might be of little interest.
Hòe then told Bảo Đại about the following prophecy that had been spread in olden times in the 
Nghệ-Tĩnh region (Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh provinces). The prophecy said, “Đụn Sơn phân giải, Bò Đái 
thất thanh, Nam Đàn sinh ánh. （庉山分解， ［or ］帯失聲，南壇生聖）” It was said that this 
prophecy came from the famous 16th-century prophet Trạng Trình (Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm). It can be 
translated as follows: “When the row of mountains in Đụn Sơn is divided and Bò Đái stream has fallen 
silent, a Sage will be born in Nam Đàn.” Hòe explained the meaning of this prophecy as follows. The 
row of mountains known as Đụn Sơn was divided by road construction at the end of the 19th century. 
In Bò Đái, there used to be water freely flowing all day long, but now the sound of the stream was no 
longer heard. These events suggested that this old prophecy was trustworthy, and indicated that the 
time had come for a Sage to appear. Who, then, was the Sage? The people thought at first that it was 
16 The text of this decree, dated August 17, is reproduced in Trần Trọng Kim, Một cơn gió bụi, pp. 195‒6 (pp. 211‒12 in the Japa-
nese translation).
17 Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, pp. 59‒61.
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the revolutionary Phan Bội Châu, but around 1920, a rumor started to circulate that it must be the pa-
triot Nguyễn Ái Quốc. This coincided with the period when people began to hear about Quốc’s revolu-
tionary activities in France.18
Based on the above explanation by Phạm Khắc Hòe, the author will add some additional comments 
on the prophecy. Among the place names included in the prophecy, the easiest one to identify is Nam 
Đàn. This is the name of a district in Nghệ An province. Nam Đàn was certainly the native place of 
both Phan Bội Châu (born in 1867) and Nguyễn Ái Quốc (born in 1890). Phan Bội Châu was a revolu-
tionary in the early 20th century. He was captured by French agents in Shanghai in 1925, sent back to 
Hà Nội under escort, and confined to Huế until his death in 1940.19 Nguyễn Ái Quốc (born Nguyễn 
Sinh Cung and later named Nguyễn Tất Thành) left Vietnam in 1911 and eventually settled in Paris. In 
1919 he became a member of the French Socialist Party. He also submitted a “Request by the people of 
Annam” to the Peace Conference in Versailles under the name Nguyễn Ái Quốc. In 1920, when the So-
cialist Party was split and the French Communist Party was formed, he became one of the founding 
members. In 1922, he became a chief editor of Le Paria, a new journal of the Communist Party’s Colo-
nial Issues Committee. He wrote a number of articles. The play “Bamboo Dragon” that Bảo Đại knew 
about had been performed when then-Emperor Khải Định visited France in 1922 as part of an event 
organized by Communist Party journal l’Humanité with a satirical intention.
Quốc’s articles and pamphlets were brought to Vietnam secretly, and they gradually made his name 
famous. Later, he adopted his best-known name of Hồ Chí Minh and led the successful August Revo-
lution in 1945.20 Phan Bội Châu’s career as a revolutionary activist ended in 1925. On the other hand, 
Quốc’s reputation began to spread in the early 1920s. In other words, Hòe’s explanation that an earlier 
“Sage” in Nam Đàn was replaced in people’s minds by another around the 1920s is reasonable.
Next, we will discuss the name of the mountain Đụn Sơn.“Đụn” is not found in a list of Sino‒Viet-
namese characters, but the chữ Nôm (demotic script) character “庉” may be used, which means a stack 
of paddy.21 “Sơn” (mountain) should be represented by the Sino‒Vietnamese character 山. A mountain 
18 Ibid, p. 61.
19 On Phan Bội Châu see白石昌也 [Shiraishi Masaya],『ベトナム民族運動と日本・アジア：ファン・ボイ・チャウの革命思想と対外
認識』巖南堂書店 [Gannando-Shoten], 1993. It has been translated into Vietnamese as Masaya Shiraishi, Phong trào dân tộc 
Việt Nam và quan hệ của nó với Nhật Bản và Châu Á: Tư tưởng của Phan Bội Châu về cách mạng và thế giới [The Vietnamese 
national movement and its relations with Japan and Asia: Phan Bội Châu’s thoughts on revolution and the world], vol.1 
(Nguyễn Như Diệm tr. and Chương Thâu ed.), and vol.2 (Trần Sơn tr. and Chương Thâu ed.), NXB Chính Trị quốc gia, 2000.
20 Major biographies of Hồ Chí Minh by Western authors include Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh: A political biography, Peter 
Wiles tr., Vintage Books, New York, 1968 (the Japanese translation is吉田康彦，伴野文夫訳『ベトナムの星』サイマル出版会，
1968); Pierre Brocheux (Claire Duiker tr.), Ho Chi Minh: A biography, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007; and Wil-
liam J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A life, Hachette, New York, 2000. In addition, for narratives of events from the 1920s to the 
1940s, see Dương Kinh Quốc ed., Việt Nam những sự kiện lịch sử (1858‒1945) [Vietnam: Historical events 1858‒1945], vol.2, 
NXB Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội, 1982; Dương Quốc Anh ed., Việt Nam những sự kiện lịch sử (1858‒1945) [Vietnam: Historical 
events 1858‒1945], vol.3, NXB Khoa học xã hội, Hà Nội, 1988; and Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism 1925‒1945, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1982, pp. 53‒63. Vietnamese versions of Nguyễn Ái Quốc’s writings during his stay in France 
are in Hồ Chí Minh Toàn tập [The complete works of Hồ Chí Minh], vol. 1, NXB Sự thật, Hà Nội, 1980.
21 For Nôm characters, the present study uses Nguyễn Quang Xỹ and Vũ Văn Kính, Tự điển chữ Nôm [Dictionary of Nôm], 
Trung tâm Học liệu, Sài Gòn, 1971; the reference for Sino‒Vietnamese characters is Đào Duy Anh, Hán-Việt Từ-điển [Sino‒
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called Đụn Sơn 庉山 must presumably be located in Nghệ An province. Looking into the relevant liter-
ature, I found an account in a collection of Phan Bội Châu’s anecdotes published by the famous histo-
rian Chương Thâu which includes a description of the landscape in Nam Đàn, home area of Phan Bội 
Châu: “When looking up, you will see the mountain of Rú Đụn (also called Hùng Sơn). On the moun-
tain are Vạn An Castle of Mai Hắc Đế, who fought against the invading Tang army in 772, and his 
shrine.”22
Keeping the above reference in mind, let us consult the section on “Mountains and Rivers” in Nghệ 
An in the gazetteer Đại Nam Nhất thống chí. It has a description of Hùng Lĩnh Sơn雄嶺山 (Mount 
Hùng Lĩnh) as follows: “ 在南壇県東烈，秀攬二社．［…］其南山下為萬安衞，梅黒帝遺壘也．有廟在
焉．屋漏話云，驩州今巨鎮，雄嶺古名山，湖分川四塞，江合海重關．是乂安之一鎮山也 .”23 This may 
be roughly translated as:
Mount Hùng Lĩnh雄嶺山 straddles the two communes of Đông Liệt東烈 and Tú Lãm秀攬 in 
Nam Đàn南壇 District.” [Several names of other mountains and adjacent rivers near Mount 
Hùng Lĩnh which are listed in the original text are omitted here.] At the southern foot of Mount 
Hùng Lĩnh, there is Vạn An Post萬安衞，which is the remains of a castle of Emperor Mai Hắc Đế
梅黒帝．A shrine to him has also been erected. [An old book] says that Hùng Lĩnh is a giant for-
tress in Hoan Châu驩州 [an old name for the area including Nghệ-Tĩnh], which has been a cele-
brated mountain since olden times. The rivers flow from every direction into the lake, from which 
many streams run down into inlets and the sea. It is really a great mountain guarding Nghệ An 
Province.
Mount Hùng Lĩnh雄嶺山 must be identical with Mount Hùng (Hùng Sơn), which was introduced 
by Chương Thâu as another name for the mountain Rú Đụn. It is common for Vietnamese places to 
have two toponyms, an “official name” written in Sino‒Vietnamese characters and a vernacular or col-
loquial name very often written in Nôm script. Thus “Mount Hùng Lĩnh” is the official name while 
“Mount Rú Đụn” is the colloquial name for the same mountain.24
In the same source there are references to the Old Castle of Vạn An萬安故城 in the “Ancient Re-
mains” section and the Mai Hắc Đế Shrine梅黒帝祠 in the “Shrines and Temples” section. The former 
reference only notes that the castle is located in the east of Nam Đàn District, guiding the readers to 
Vietnamese dictionary], NXB Trường thi, Sài Gòn, 1957.
22 Chương Thâu, Giai thoại Phan Bội Châu [Anecdotes about Phan Bội Châu], NXB Nghệ An, Vinh, 1991, pp. 13‒14.
23 『大南一統志』[Đại Nam Nhất thống chí] [Gazetteer of Đại Nam] 乂安省［Nghệ An Province］(Tokyo reprint), 印度支那協会 
[Society of Indochina], 1941, p. 1540; (Sài Gòn published edition), Nhà Văn hóa, Sài Gòn, 1965, p. 42 (Chinese text) and p. 38 
(Vietnamese translation).
24 Nguyễn Huyền Anh, Việt Nam danh nhân từ điển [Dictionary of famous Vietnamese], Nhà Sách Khai trí, Sài Gòn, 1967, pp. 
190‒91 mentions that Mai Thúc Loan (Mai Hắc Đế ’s real name) escaped from attack by Tang forces, hid in Độn Sơn and died 
shortly thereafter. Here, the toponym “Độn Sơn” is used instead of Mount Hùng Lĩnh; “Độn” is similar to “Đụn.” The name “Rú 
Đụn” is introduced as another name for Hùng Sơn in Chương Thâu, Giai thoại, as mentioned earlier.
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refer to the “Shrines and Temples” section for more details.25 The latter section says that the shrine is 
located in Hương Lan Commune香攬社 of Nam Đàn District, with the following explanation:
Mai Hắc Đế’s real name was Mai Thúc Loan （梅叔鸞）. With his dark face and muscular appear-
ance, he won wide popularity. Due to the extreme tyranny of the [Chinese] An Nam Protectorate
安南都護 during the Kaiyuan開元 reign of the Tang Dynasty [the first half of the 8th century], 
many local people escaped to the mountain forests and began to engage in predatory practices. 
This was when Mai Thúc Loan stood up to go after the bandits. Moreover, he allied with countries 
such as Champa and Cambodia and thus rallied 300,000 soldiers. After occupying Hoan Châu （驩
州）, Mai Thúc Loan proclaimed himself Emperor and established his capital at Vạn An. When the 
Tang sent a punitive force, Mai Hắc Đế gathered soldiers on Hùng Sơn雄山 (Mount Hùng) and 
carried out resistance for several years, but he eventually died of illness there. The local people 
built a shrine on the south of the mountain to worship his spirit.26
Here the mountain where Mai Hắc Đế barricaded himself is indicated as Hùng Sơn雄山，presum-
ably a shortened form of “Hùng Lĩnh.” In any case, the description in this text proves that Mount Hùng 
Lĩnh is a famous mountain in Nghệ An, treated as a sacred place especially by the legend of Mai Hắc 
Đế. Available sources cannot confirm whether a road was constructed on the mountainside at the end 
of the 19th century, but if the earlier statement of Phạm Khắc Hòe is right, the shape of the mountain 
was modified during the early colonial period. Thus, what “Sage” implies here should be a hero fighting 
against French rule.
Next we will consider Bò Đái. The gazetteer describes Võ Nguyên Tuyền武原泉 as follows: “ 在清漳
県，一名蒲帯泉．自箕山上懸崖数十丈，注于藍江．相傳古者，泉聲鈴鈴十里外．近来沙土培壅，泉流
不息，而泉聲寂不聞矣．古訣云，蒲帯絶聲，即此 .”27 This passage roughly means that Võ Nguyên 
Tuyền
also known as Bồ Đái Tuyền蒲帯泉, is located in Thanh Chương District清漳県. From the top of 
Mount Cơ 箕山, it falls over several tens of trượng数十丈 of precipice down into the Lam River藍
江. Legend has it that the pure sound of its [running] water could be heard from as far away as ten 
lý十里. But this sound has disappeared recently due to accumulated earth and sand blocking the 
flow of water. This is what an old tale （古訣） means when it says that “Bồ Đái is silenced.”
The document here refers to Bồ Đái tuyền蒲帯泉 28 as another name for Võ Nguyên tuyền武原泉; the 
25 Đại Nam Nhất thống chí (Nghệ An), pp. 1570 (Tokyo edition), 72 (Sài Gòn edition Chinese), 74 (Sài Gòn edition Vietnamese).
26 Ibid., pp. 1578 (Tokyo edition), 78 (Sài Gòn edition Chinese), 80‒81 (Sài Gòn edition Vietnamese).
27 Ibid.,pp. 1565‒66 (Tokyo edition), 67‒8 (Sài Gòn edition Chinese), 68 (Sài Gòn edition Vietnamese).
28 The original text has “Bồ Đái” 蒲帯 (two Sino‒Vietnamese characters), while Hòe’s memoir has “Bò Đái” （which would require 
a Nôm character for the first word, either  or ）.
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former toponym is colloquial, the latter Sino‒Vietnamese. What the term “tuyền” （泉） actually means 
is a valley with rapid flowing or falling water. According to the document, the reason for the “silence” 
was the accumulation of earth and sand, presumably not a manmade cause. Since Đại Nam Nhất thống 
chí was finally completed in the third year of Duy Tan (1908), it is implied that there had been some 
abnormal change in the valley before the beginning of the 20th century. Although the precise meaning 
of “old tale” （古訣） is unclear, this may be an indication that some kind of legend or prophecy had ex-
isted since olden times. Thanh Chương is a mountainous district, lying to the west of Nam Đàn Dis-
trict and extending to the Lao border.
The next section will discuss another, more famous prophecy attributed to the same prophet, 
Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm.
2.　e Second Prophecy
Since Phạm Khắc Hòe believed the above prophecy to be true, his tone was quite serious when he 
talked to the Emperor. Bảo Đại also showed considerable interest in this story, and quoted the follow-
ing phrase by the same prophet: “Hoành Sơn nhất đái, vạn đại dung thân横山一帯, 萬代容身,”29 literal-
ly “[In] the Hoành Sơn area, ten thousand generations are secured.” Hòe gives the following account of 
an episode involving this prophecy. In October 1944, Bảo Đại organized a party in his palace at Đà Lạt 
to celebrate his 32nd birthday; a number of French guests were invited. Together with Governor-Gen-
eral Jean Decoux and Phạm Quỳnh, Minister of the Interior, he arranged a small performance at the 
party. Decoux made a toast which included the above prophecy in his congratulatory speech, deliber-
ately using the Sino‒Vietnamese pronunciation with no translation so as to make it sound somewhat 
mysterious. Needless to say, most French people present had no idea what it was about. Then Bảo Đại 
told Phạm Quỳnh, who had the honor of sitting with the Emperor, to give an explanation in French.
Phạm Quỳnh, pretending to be caught off guard, thought for a while, and began his comments like 
an impromptu speech. He said, first, “the author of this prophecy was Trạng Trình, namely Nguyễn 
Bỉnh Khiêm. He was a unique and great prophet who made truthful prognostications about every-
thing.” Second, “this prophecy was about Nguyễn Hoàng, who was Bảo Đại’s ancestor, i.e. the founder 
of the Nguyễn royal family [in the 16th century]. Its contents proved to be an indication of the lasting 
nature of the Nguyễn Dynasty.” (The details of this will be discussed below). Third, “the fact that the 
great Governor-General of French Indochina Decoux mentioned this prophecy at a party celebrating 
the Emperor’s birthday implies that a promise was made in the name of the French government to 
protect the Nguyễn Dynasty under any circumstance for the common interests between the French 
and the Vietnamese people.”
According to Hòe’s memoir, the details of the prophecy that Phạm Quỳnh explained at this time 
were as follows:
29 Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, p. 61.
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Nguyễn Hoàng, founder of the Nguyễn royal family, was originally a military commander in the 
north under the rule of Trịnh Kiểm [in the 16th century]. But he was ordered to become a mili-
tary governor in Thuận Hóa [the area including Huế]. Hoàng visited the prophet Trạng Trình ask-
ing to read his future. The prophet’s answer was “Hoành Sơn nhất đái, vạn đại dung thân.” It meant 
that the fate of the family would be secured for generations if protected by the Hoành Sơn moun-
tains. In fact, Nguyễn Hoàng became the military governor of the area south of the Đèo Ngang 
[the Ngang Pass in the Hoành Sơn area of present-day Quảng Bình province] and founded the ge-
nealogy of Nguyễn [as rulers]. Since his arrival in Thuận Hóa in 1558 until today, there have been 
nine generations of military governors [through the late 18th century] and 13 reigns of emperors 
[since 1802]. This demonstrates the stable rule of the Nguyễn Dynasty. Especially since they re-
ceived the protection of great French government [through the 1884 treaty], their rule has become 
even more firm.30
The original story about Khiêm’s prophecy had been widely spread as a “legend” concerning the ori-
gins of the Nguyễn Dynasty. The dynastic chronicles Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên give the following ac-
count (summary):
Nguyễn Kim and Nguyễn Hoàng, father and son, along with Trịnh Kiểm, fought against the Mạc 
family that had usurped the throne [from the Lê dynasty in 1527], contributing to the restoration 
of the Lê [in 1592, after decades of civil war]. But after the death of Nguyễn Kim, the conflict be-
tween the Nguyễn and Trịnh families escalated [during the course of their war against the Mạc]. 
Compared to the Trịnh who had become thoroughly entrenched in the Lê forces, the Nguyễn 
were in a lesser position. Nguyễn Hoàng, worrying about the situation, secretly sent a messenger 
to Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm to read his future. When Nguyễn Hoàng heard the answer [i.e., the proph-
ecy about the Hoành Sơn], he immediately understood its meaning. Then, he asked his elder sister 
[Trịnh Kiểm’s wife] to mediate so that he could become a governor of Thuận Hóa [in the extreme 
south of the realm]. Trịnh Kiểm agreed to this plan, and his appointment was officially given by 
the Lê Emperor. Nguyễn Hoàng thus assumed his post in Thuận Hóa in the tenth month in the 
first year of Chính Trị正治 [1558].31
The following is a quote from the original description of the scene where Nguyễn Binh Khiêm was 
making his prediction: “聞阮秉謙（海陽中庵人，莫状元，以太保致仕）精於術数．密使人往問之．秉謙
目庭前假山，浪吟曰横山一帯，萬代容身．使者帰以告，上会其意.”32 This may be translated as follows:
30 Ibid., pp. 93‒5.
31 『大南寔録前編』Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên］[Chronicle of Đại Nam, preliminary section] (Keio University reprinted edi-
tion), 慶応義塾大学語研究所，1961, vol. 1, pp. 1‒6; a Vietnamese translation is in Nguyễn Huyền Anh, Việt Nam danh nhân 
từ điển, pp. 248‒9.
32 Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên, vol. 1, p. 6.
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Having heard that Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm (from Trung Am in Hải Dương, Trạng nguyên [the high-
est degree in the examination system] of the Mạc, retired with the rank of ái bảo) was a master 
of fortune-telling, [Nguyễn Hoàng ] secretly sent a messenger and asked the prophet to read his 
future. Khiêm, while looking at a man-made hill in the front yard, chanted the following phrase: 
“Hoành Sơn nhất đái, vạn đại dung thân.” As soon as the messenger returned and reported this, 
Nguyễn Hoàng immediately knew what that meant.
The following is the description of Hoành Sơn in Đại Nam Nhất thống chí:
Hoành Sơn横山 is a mountain range along the border between Bình Chánh district平政県 of 
Quảng Bình province広平省 in the south and Kỳ Anh district奇英県 of Hà Tĩnh province河静省 
in the north. The range is shaped like a great wall and was a key defensive area between the North 
and the South of the country. Both the first and the second Emperors of the Nguyễn Dynasty, Gia 
Long and Minh Mạng, carefully prepared their defenses there. When Nguyễn Hoàng, founder of 
the Nguyễn lineage, was still in Hà Nội, he sent a messenger to Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm to ask his for-
tune. Khiêm walked toward a man-made hill in the front yard, looking at a troop of ants beside it, 
and said, “Hoành Sơn nhất đái, vạn đại dung thân.” In fact, our Nguyễn Dynasty had its founda-
tions in this area and controlled the southern region.33
Regarding the career of Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm, the passage quoted earlier from Đại Nam ực lục Tiền 
biên mentions very briefly that he originated from Trung Am中庵 village in Hải Dương Province海陽
省，passed the exam under the Mạc regime as trạng nguyên （状元，the most successful candidate）, 
and retired with the rank of ái bảo太保. The Hải Dương Phong vật chí (Records of Hải Dương fea-
tures), compiled in 1811, also mentions that Khiêm was born in Trung Am and completed the final 
stage of his examinations in the year Ất Mùi乙未 (1535) according to the Sino‒Vietnamese calendar. 
The Mạc granted him the title of Trình quốc công程國公; the term “công” is usually translated as 
“duke.” The text also says that several years later, when an envoy from the Qing dynasty came to Viet-
nam, he praised Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm, saying “In the area of Lingnan黎南, I found a great person 
named Trình Tuyền程泉 who was well acquainted with the sciences.”34 According to another docu-
ment, Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm’s widely known pseudonym “Trạng Trình” 状程 referred to his examination 
title Trạng nguyên状元 combined with his title of Trình quốc công程国公.35
Bảo Đại in his memoir referred to the same prophecy. After he returned from France in 1932, he or-
33 『大南一統志』[Đại Nam Nhất thống chí] 廣平省 [Quảng Bình province] (Tokyo reprint), pp. 973‒4.
34 『海陽風物誌』[Hải Dương phong vật chí] [Records of Hải Dương features]; Nha Văn-hóa, Bộ Văn-hóa Giáo-dục và Thanh-
niên, Sài Gòn, 1968, pp. 217 (Chinese text) and 67 (Vietnamese translation).
35 Thai Van Kiem and Hồ Ðắc Ðàm ed., Việt Nam Nhân vật chí Vựng biên [Collected biographies of individual Vietnamese], Nhà 
Văn hóa, Sài Gòn, 1962, pp. 109‒11. Nguyễn Bỉnh Khiêm’s prophecy about Nguyễn Hoàng is also quoted in this book and in 
Nguyễn Huyền Anh,Việt Nam danh nhân từ điển, pp. 218‒19.
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dered the officials in charge of archives to provide him with historical materials so that he could study 
the history of the Nguyễn Dynasty. According to his study, the origin of the Nguyễn could be traced 
back to Nguyễn Bặc during the Đinh Dynasty (the latter half of the 10th century), but its more direct 
founders were Nguyễn Kim (born in 1468), Bặc’s 13th-generation descendant, and his son Nguyễn 
Hoàng (born in 1525). One day Hoàng sent a messenger to an ascetic scholar named Nguyễn Bỉnh 
Khiêm who was said to have supernatural powers. When the messenger arrived, Khiêm mumbled, “A 
l’abri d’une chaȋne de montagnes traversale, pendant dix mille générations, il sera trannquille.” while 
looking at a rock in his front yard. When Hoàng heard the messenger’s report and understood what 
the prediction meant, he asked his elder sister, who was married to Trịnh Kiểm, for help. Through that 
connection, Hoàng was appointed as governor of Thanh Hóa province. When he arrived at the border 
of Thanh Hóa, the local residents welcomed him holding seven jars of water. The headman of the com-
mune said to him, “You now have your own government. Our people are giving you jars of water as a 
gift. This indicates that you will found a throne.”36 Except for the last part that describes the local peo-
ple welcoming Hoàng, the details are not different from the passage in Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên 
quoted earlier. However, it is clearly a mistake to read Hoàng’s assigned post as the governor of Thanh 
Hóa rather than Thuận Hóa. Thanh Hóa was the birthplace of the Nguyễn family, located farther north 
of Hoành Sơn.37
Bảo Đại went on to recount some episodes involving his earliest ancestor, Nguyễn Hoàng. In the 
course of a battle against the remnants of the Mạc family in 1572, a goddess appeared in his dream and 
promised to assist him. He selected the most beautiful girl among her handmaidens, and adopted a 
clever tactic that she taught him, which enabled him to defeat the enemy. Hoàng built a temple on the 
site of his victory to worship the goddess. Peace was achieved and spread through his territory, which 
would develop into a virtual kingdom. In 1613, just before his death, Hoàng called his son to tell him 
that the whole area of Thuận Hóa and Quảng Nam would be a land protected by a natural fortress, and 
suggested: “The throne will be secured for thousands of generations by making use of the region’s nat-
ural and geographical advantages.” That was how the capital of the Nguyễn family was established in 
Thuận Hóa (Huế).38 The episode regarding the goddess was a summary of the description in the entry 
for the year Nhâm Thân壬申 (1572) of Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên,39 while Nguyễn Hoàng ’s testa-
ment was a summary of the entries for the years Nhâm Dần壬寅 (1602) and Quý Sửu発丑 (1613) of 
the same chronicle. 40
36 Bao Dai, Dragon d’Annam, pp. 36‒8.
37 The Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên reports that Nguyễn Hoàng, who went South in 1558, built a military post in Ái Tử愛子，Vũ 
Xương district武昌県（or Đăng Xương district登昌県）, now in Quảng Trị province; see also Đại Nam Nhất thống chí, Quảng 
Bình province (Tokyo reprint), p. 848.
38 Bao Dai, Dragon d’Annam, pp. 38‒9.
39 Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên (Keio University edition), vol.1, pp. 10‒11.
40 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 21, 23‒4.
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3.　Link between the Two Prophecies
Bảo Đại linked those two prophecies in his mind: the first concerning the Sage from Nam Đàn dis-
trict of Nghệ An and the second regarding the earliest ancestor of the Nguyễn royal family. What did 
they mean? For an answer to that question, let us continue to look into Phạm Khắc Hòe’s memoir.
After some exchanges with Hòe about the prophecies, Bảo Đại concluded by saying: “If the leader of 
the Việt Minh is actually Sage Nguyễn Ái Quốc, then I am prepared to abdicate right away.” Three days 
later, on August 23, the local Việt Minh leaders in Huế sent an ultimatum to Bảo Đại that all his power 
and command over the royal guard force should be transferred to them. A Cabinet meeting was con-
vened on very short notice in the Court, and the decision was adopted to accept the Việt Minh’s de-
mand and to offer the Emperor’s abdication. This was also the occasion where Trần Trọng Kim’s provi-
sional Cabinet was finally dissolved.
In the morning of the following day (August 24), when Hòe came to see Bảo Đại, the Emperor 
showed him a telegram with a gloomy look on his face. The telegram had been received at night on the 
previous day from the Bắc Bộ (Tonkin) People’s Revolutionary Committee in Hà Nội. It said that “the 
Provisional People’s Revolutionary Government has been established, with Hồ Chí Minh as Chairman. 
We demand the Emperor’s immediate abdication for the sake of national independence and unifica-
tion.” The telegram was signed by Nguyễn Xiển, Nguyễn Văn Huyên, Ngụy Như Kontum, and Hồ Hữu 
Tường. The message disappointed and saddened Bảo Đại, because there was no mention of Nguyễn Ái 
Quốc at all. That meant a denial of the first prophecy “Nam Đàn sinh ánh” (A Sage will be born in 
Nam Đàn), and consequently of the second prophecy “vạn đại dung thân” (ten thousand generations 
are secured) as well. Understanding the situation, Hòe visited friends and acquaintances in different 
parts of the city of Huế to confirm that Hồ Chí Minh was none other than Nguyễn Ái Quốc himself. As 
soon as Bảo Đại learnt this news, he said in French: “Ça vaut bien le coup alors.” What he meant was it 
would be worth following through with his abdication.41
Phạm Khắc Hòe’s memoir as stated above can lead to the following conclusions. First, the prophe-
cies for the Sage of Nam Đàn and for the founder of the Nguyễn royal family were given by the same 
prophet. Therefore, if the first prophecy came true, the second one would inevitably as well. In other 
words, so long as the leader of the revolutionary government was the Sage of Nam Đàn, i.e. Nguyễn Ái 
Quốc, then the peace and security of the Nguyễn clan would be eternal. Second, under the circum-
stances, even if Bảo Đại ended up abdicating, it would not ruin the political fortunes of the Nguyễn 
clan, as long as his power was handed over to Sage Nguyễn Ái Quốc. That was how the implications of 
the prophecies were interpreted by both a young Emperor who had spent more than a decade in 
France and his Chief Palace Secretary who was becoming a Việt Minh sympathizer. In addition to that, 
we need to suggest a third conclusion as follows. Now at this point, the peace and security of the 
Nguyễn royal family depended on the presence of Sage Nguyễn Ái Quốc. In other words, only if Quốc 
41 Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, pp. 62‒9.
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was the revolutionary leader would the prophecy that “ten thousand generations [of the Nguyễn clan] 
are secured” be guaranteed. Thus, Sage Nguyễn Ái Quốc would influence the destiny of the outgoing 
Emperor and his clan. Bảo Đại, who should be the Son of Heaven, could no longer govern the exis-
tence of his subject Nguyễn Ái Quốc. This was a powerful sign of a “reversal of order” or alteration of 
Heaven’s will, meaning a “revolution.”
Bảo Đại recalled a series of events during this period as follows. In the evening of August 22, the 
head of the Huế Post Office delivered a telegram from Hà Nội, demanding that he transfer power. On 
the following day, he found that everyone had departed, leaving him alone in the palace. In solitude his 
thoughts were as follows:
Now the League for the Independence of Vietnam [Việt Minh] has mobilized masses of people, 
concretized the wishes of the people, and given me an order. I have no knowledge of their leaders, 
but they are communicating with the Allied forces: the Chinese, Americans, and French. I, on the 
other hand, sent messages to President Truman, Generalissimo Tchang Kaï-chek, the king of En-
gland, and General de Gaulle, but have received no response. They have weapons and the means 
to acquire power, while I have been isolated in a quiet palace, unable to coordinate even my own 
aides. This situation seems to imply a miraculous achievement of their success. Isn’t their over-
whelming success a sign that they have obtained the Mandate of Heaven (mandat du ciel)? The 
people naturally have quite unquestionable instincts. In a historic moment, they never fail to 
make a commitment to those who have the mission to guide and lead them.42
We can clearly see from his memoir that Bảo Đại himself was coming to the realization that it was 
time to accept Heaven’s will.43
III.　Emperor and Court
According to Phạm Khắc Hòe’s memoir, when he had a conversation with Bảo Đại about the above 
two prophecies, the emperor related another supernatural occurrence:
It happened on National Day about two months ago. I left the Kiến Trung Palace and arrived at 
the Can Thành Palace through the corridor. I was in a palanquin, just heading to the Thái Hòa 
Palace where the ceremony was going to be held. A huge beam suddenly fell with a loud noise in 
the middle of the corridor that I had just walked through. If that had happened a few seconds ear-
lier, I would have been killed. My mother, who had seen the whole thing, thought that it was a sa-
42 Bao Dai, Dragon d’Annam, pp. 118‒119; Bảo Đại’s and Phạm Khắc Hòe’s memoirs differ by one day as to when the telegram 
was received.
43 Paul Mus, Viet Nam, Sociologie d’une guerre, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1952, ch. 2 is a classic interpretation of the August Revo-
lution from the perspective of the “Heavenly Mandate”; see also John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, e Vietnamese and their 
revolution, Harper & Row, New York, 1970, ch. 3.
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cred presage that some significant turnaround would occur during my reign. But I am still alive as 
you see now.44
The National Day of the Nguyễn Dynasty was the day commemorating the coronation of Gia Long, 
the dynasty’s first Emperor, in 1802.45 Kiến Trung Palace建中殿 was a place for the Emperor’s day-to-
day activities and also housed his office for conducting routine work. Can Thành Palace乾成殿 was 
used as a private residence for successive rulers until the reign of Emperor Duy Tân (1907‒16), while 
Thái Hòa Palace太和殿 was used for major ceremonies.46
Having heard this story, Hòe expressed his agreement with the Empress Dowager’s judgement and 
pointed out that the incident had happened just before the Emperor conducted the ceremony for Na-
tional Day. He said, “the huge fallen beam symbolizes fallen French colonialism. The French used to 
escort you to the site of national ceremony. The reason why you have survived even after the French 
departure is that the revolution has given sanctuary to you, Sire.” In response, the Emperor asked, “Do 
you mean I should abdicate and hand over all my power to the Việt Minh?” Hoè answered, “Yes, Your 
Majesty.”47
Bảo Đại’s own memoir contains a detailed description of the incident as well:
The entire royal court gathered to celebrate the national ceremony on Gia Long’s coronation day. 
The most important ritual of the year was held without the presence of the French and other for-
eigners. The imperial flag was unfurled over the royal cavalry. As the exalted host of the ceremony, 
I was waiting in the reception hall. Then I was about to enter the temple to perform a ritual to the 
ancestors in the name of my people. As soon as I took my seat in a palanquin, a huge beam fell 
with a loud noise in the corridor where I had passed through just seconds before. My mother 
prognosticated: “A grave incident was just foretold; we just received a divine prophecy. Soon this 
will become a major turning point for the Emperor.”48
There is not much difference with the account in Hòe’s memoir, but we need to note the following 
points. First, the ceremony on this National Day was the most important among the annual Court 
events.49 Second, it was being held without foreign officials; in other words, this was the first national 
44 Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, p. 62.
45 Đại Nam ực lục Tiền biên (Keio University edition), vol. 17, p. 1. According to this text, on the first day of the fifth month in 
1802, an altar was set up to worship Heaven and the name of the reign was changed to “Gia Long.” This was the beginning of 
the Nguyễn Dynasty. See also岩村成允 [Iwamura Shigemitsu] ［安南通史』[Overview of Annam History], 富山房 [Fuzanbo], 
1941, p. 282.
46 For details of these buildings, see Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, pp. 11, 29‒30 as well as『大南一統志』[Đại Nam Nhất 
thống chí], 京師 [Kinh sư, Imperial capital] (Tokyo reprint), 印度支那協会，1941, pp. 54ff.
47 Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, p. 62.
48 Bao Dai, Dragon d’Annam, p. 111.
49 A ritual ceremony on the Nam Giao platform南郊壇 was another major event performed by the Emperor, but only once every 
three years (ibid., pp. 81‒90), thus it was not an “annual event.”
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ceremony held as an “independent” nation.
The following is Bảo Đại’s interpretation of the incident: Since olden days, the emperor’s destiny had 
been considered with a link to the destiny of the royal court. All existence of this world, such as hu-
man, animals, plants and minerals, was merely a reflection of the universe. A universal counterpart to 
everything should exist somewhere. Everything coming into being in this sacred imperial palace 
would find its echo in the Emperor himself as well as in his life.50
Looking at the memoirs written by Bảo Đại and Phạm Khắc Hòe, we can clearly see the following 
points. First, this incident took on a sort of fatalistic tone when it was recounted. There was some 
background context that one could not dismiss as mere coincidence. The incident occurred in the 
midst of the turbulence starting with the Japanese military coup and lasting through Japan’s defeat and 
the August Revolution. Second, there was a belief that the royal Court, Emperor, and imperial family 
shared the same destiny and had a supernatural causal relationship with the destiny of the entire king-
dom.51 Third, it was particularly significant that the incident had occurred just before the most im-
portant annual event for the Court. Fourth, there was a question of how to evaluate the national cere-
mony without the attendance of foreign officials. Bảo Đại had a latent desire to think of it as a symbol 
of the Empire of Vietnam becoming “independent.” On the other hand, Phạm Khắc Hòe interpreted it 
as a demonstration that the imperial Court had lost its protector, the French. Hòe’s idea was based on 
his judgement that the imperial dynasty of Vietnam had already lost any potential for self-reliance. 
Thus, in his mind the only option the Emperor could take at this point was to depend on a new protec-
tor, namely the revolutionary government.
Bảo Đại eventually accepted Hoè’s argument. According to the latter’s memoir, on August 24 he ob-
tained Bảo Đại’s consent to send a reply to Hà Nội affirming the Emperor’s willingness to step down.52 
The telegram also requested that “the leader of the Provisional People’s Revolutionary Government 
immediately come to Thuận Hóa (Huế) to receive the transfer of power from the Emperor in order to 
assume responsibility for the history and the people of this country, and to have the new government 
officially appear in front of the people’s eyes.” On the following day he received a reply from Hà Nội 
informing him of their intention to send delegates of the revolutionary government to Huế. On the 
same day, the imperial rescript for the emperor’s abdication was publicly announced in the royal capi-
tal. On August 26, Bảo Đại held a ceremony to report his abdication to his ancestors in the Thế Miếu
世廟，the shrine dedicated to the previous rulers of the Nguyễn Dynasty. Only a few imperial bureau-
crats attended the ceremony and then went to Kiến Trung Palace to bid farewell to the Emperor and 
Empress. Hòe spent the next few days reviewing the list of Court assets that would be handed over to 
50 Ibid., p. 111.
51 Mythological aspects of imperial palaces in Vietnam are discussed in白石昌也 [Shiraishi Masaya]「ベトナムの〈まち〉：特に
〈国〉との関連を中心として」[Vietnamese ‘towns’ in the particular context of their relationship with the ‘state’] in『東南アジア
研究』[Southeast Asian Studies] (Kyoto University), 21, 1 (1983): 97‒113.
52 Bảo Đại’s memoir (pp. 118‒119) suggests the date of August 23 when he sent a reply to the “Comité des Patriotes” in Hanoi, 
telling his intension of “le transfert des pouvoirs” and demanding the Committee leaders to immediately come to Hue.
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the revolutionary government.
On August 29, a delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government sent from Hà Nội arrived 
in Huế. The Court requested that after the Emperor’s abdication, the new government treat the dynas-
ty’s ancestral tombs and shrines with respect and that royal family members be treated like other citi-
zens without any discrimination. The delegation agreed. The following day, the abdication ceremony 
was performed in the pavilion at Ngọ Môn午門，the main gate for the imperial palace. The delega-
tion’s vehicles entered from the central doorway of Ngọ Môn, which had been reserved only for the 
Emperor and Governor-General of Indochina. The Emperor’s yellow flag was first flown on the flag-
staff on Ngọ Môn. Bảo Đại, dressed in the formal attire of yellow turban and áo dài, read out the re-
script of abdication in front of tens of thousands of people. When he had finished, the yellow flag was 
lowered and the Việt Minh’s red flag with a gold star (which became the national flag of the new-
ly-born Democratic Republic of Vietnam) was raised, while a twenty-one-gun salute was fired. Bảo Đại 
handed over the huge golden seal of state weighing nearly 10 kg and a great sword of state stored in a 
gold-encrusted scabbard to the chief of the delegation, Trần Huy Liệu.
After Liệu, who was Minister of Propaganda in the Provisional Government, read aloud the state-
ment, Nguyễn Lương Bằng (who became Vice-President of the DRV 24 years later), attached a badge 
showing the red flag with a gold star on Bảo Đại’s clothing. This was how the commoner Vĩnh Thụy 
was born. On September 1, Vĩnh Thụy and his family left the Forbidden City, taking their personal be-
longings, and moved into a private residence, An Định Palace. On September 2, Hồ Chí Minh read the 
famous Declaration of Independence at Ba Đình Square in Hà Nội, formally establishing the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam.53
Conclusion
For Bảo Đại, the August Revolution meant his abdication and the end of his Empire. During the pe-
riod between his declaration of “independence” on March 11 and his abdication on August 30, he had 
been forced into a situation where he had no alternative to giving up his throne even though he was 
still hoping for the survival of the dynasty. During the days following the Japanese surrender on Au-
gust 15, the Emperor went through the process of persuading himself to abdicate. What he always kept 
in mind during that period was the importance of “the Mandate of Heaven” and the need to ensure 
peace and security for the imperial family. Apparently, what directly influenced his state of mind were 
the words and behavior of key personnel, such as Phạm Khắc Hòe and some Ministers in the Cabinet, 
who were already acting in concert with the Việt Minh.54 More fundamentally, however, there was an 
air of excitement for the Revolution surrounding the entire nation and specifically in the city of Huế, a 
53 The description of events in this section is mainly based on Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, pp. 69‒90. Although there are 
discrepancies in details with the account found in Bao Dai, Dragon d’Annam, pp. 117‒22, they are not discussed here.
54 Hòe’s memoir suggests that he himself had the greatest influence on Bảo Đại’s decision to abdicate and transfer power; Bảo 
Đại, on the other hand, wrote that it was Tạ Quang Bửu, Deputy Minister of Youth, who provided him with information about 
the Việt Minh and significantly influenced his state of mind (ibid., pp. 113, 118).
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stark contrast with the mood in the imperial palace, which was becoming increasingly quieter and 
more isolated as time went by.
The Việt Minh leadership under Hồ Chí Minh, President of the Provisional Government, was strate-
gically using Bảo Đại’s mental turbulence to make arrangements for his abdication. Hồ did not re-
spond to Bảo Đại’s request to come to Huế and form a new Cabinet; instead, he established his own 
government in Hà Nội. However, he respected the formalities of transferring power from the imperial 
court. Hồ did not attend the abdication ceremony conducted in Huế; instead, Trần Huy Liệu, who was 
unimpressive in Bảo Đại’s eyes, was sent on Hồ’s behalf. 55 In any case, the abdication ceremony per-
formed in front of tens of thousands of audience was to a large degree the act of a “theater state.”56 A 
few days later, the former Emperor, now the commoner Vĩnh Thụy, was invited to be “Supreme Advis-
er” for Hồ’s new government and was summoned to Hà Nội where Hồ resided.
Similarly, the new government agreed to take care of the tombs and shrines of the Nguyễn Dynasty. 
This was the minimum condition that Bảo Đại eagerly desired in order to guarantee the fulfilment of 
the prophecy, “ten thousand generations are secured.” In exchange, he would turn over his palace, 
which shared his destiny, along with the golden seal and great sword of state that were the symbols of 
the Throne, as well as the treasures of successive emperors. Hồ Chí Minh dealt with these issues in a 
manner corresponding to each of Bảo Đại’s ideas, notably his interpretations of kingship and his ac-
ceptance of the changing Mandate of Heaven. Thus Hồ and his government set up a stage on which 
Bảo Đại would eventually submit to the new order.
What was left to Vĩnh Thụy as a commoner was the role of “Supreme Adviser” for the new govern-
ment. He left the former royal capital of Huế for Hà Nội. In Cabinet meetings he was given a seat di-
rectly opposite Hồ Chí Minh, rather like the position of a hostess sitting face-to-face with a host at a 
banquet table. Similarly, Hồ always placed Vĩnh Thụy on his right in public and would gesture for the 
latter to precede him when they met guests from foreign countries. Each time Vĩnh Thụy had to say, 
“No, thank you, Mr. President, please go ahead; I am nothing more than an adviser.”57
The usefulness of the former Emperor Bảo Đại or Vĩnh Thụy for the revolutionary government was 
multifaceted. From a domestic perspective, the staging of a peaceful transfer of imperial power provid-
ed a solid basis for demonstrating the new government’s legitimacy. Appointing the former Emperor 
as “Supreme Adviser” was indisputable proof of the revolutionaries’ “unite the people” policy as well as 
a good test case to manifest the new government’s tolerance towards members of the old regime.58 
From a diplomatic perspective, his presence seemed to have some positive influence in negotiations 
55 Ibid., p.119. Bảo Đại could not help but feel somewhat disappointed at what he felt was an unprepossessing delegate sent by 
the government for his abdication ceremony.
56 Clifford Geertz, Negara, the theatre state in nineteenth-century Bali, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980; translated 
into Japanese as小泉潤二訳『ヌガラ：19世紀バリの劇場国家』みすず書房，1990; and George Balandier, Le pouvoir sur scènes, 
Balland, Paris, 1980; the Japanese translation is渡辺公三訳『舞台の上の権力：政治のドラマトゥルギー』平凡社，1982.
57 Bao Dai, Dragon d’Annam, pp. 130‒131, 135.
58 Shiraishi,『ベトナム民族運動と日本・アジア』， pp. 705‒706.
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with Guomindang generals, French delegates and US military officers. However, over time his useful-
ness began to fade, a process which was already foreshadowed in the first meetings in Hà Nội between 
the President of the new government and the former Emperor.
Phạm Khắc Hòe’s memoir provides the following account. On September 4, 1945, Vĩnh Thụy ar-
rived in Hà Nội. The next morning, he visited Hồ’s official residence to pay a courtesy call. That after-
noon, President Hồ visited Vĩnh Thụy’s villa for a return call. Hồ arrived at three o’clock in the after-
noon: Vĩnh Thụy and his staff greeted him outside and then followed him inside the building, where 
he was invited into the guest room. Hòe urged the staff to leave the room for fear of disturbing the host 
and his guest. However, many of them were so fascinated at seeing President Hồ in person for the first 
time that they were unwilling to leave and remained in the room until Hồ went out to the terrace, tak-
ing Adviser Vĩnh Thụy by the arm. On the terrace the two men, arm-in-arm, walked back and forth 
talking for nearly half an hour. Hòe wrote his impressions of this meeting.
The thin veteran revolutionary leader wore a high-necked khaki shirt and rubber sandals.59 Arm-
in-arm with him was an overweight young ruler whose cheeks were so plump that they almost 
covered his eyes. His hair was brushed with oil, and he wore tightly fitting clothing with a chic tie 
around his neck. His shoes were glossy. This combination of the two demonstrating national unifi-
cation was a rare and even unique scene in world history.60
The contrasting styles of the old and new heads of state symbolized the differences in government, 
order and era between the former and current regimes. Eventually this unique “national solidarity” 
would fail. With the outbreak of the First Indochina War at the end of 1946, the two men would end 
up confronting each other once again: one as leader of the revolutionary government leading a war of 
resistance against France in the mountains and the other as a head of a state backed up by the French, 
working in a palace in Sài Gòn.
59 On the leader’s image symbolized by Hồ Chí Minh’s clothes and sandals, see白石昌也 [Shiraishi Masaya]「ホーチミンの指導者
像に関する一考察：〈ホーチミニティー〉のドラマトゥルギー（1）」(A consideration of Hồ Chí Minh’s image as a leader̶the dra-
maturgy of Hochiminity [1]) in『高崎経済大学論集』[Essay collections of Takasaki City University of Economics], 30, 3/4 
(1988): 83‒108. See also Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh: A biographical introduction, Studio Vista, London, 1971; the Japanese 
translation is 陸井三郎訳『ホー・チ・ミン伝』2 vols., 岩波害店，1974.
60 Phạm Khắc Hòe, Từ triều đình Huế, pp. 99‒103.
